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Ninety years after it was signed, the Montreux Convention remains one of the clearest demonstrations of how control over a maritime chokepoint can translate into enduring geopolitical power.
Türkiye marked the anniversary on 20 July by reaffirming its commitment to the convention, describing it as one of the principal guarantees of peace, security and stability in the Black Sea.
Signed on 20 July 1936, the convention restored Turkish control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles and established the legal framework governing the movement of commercial vessels and warships between the Mediterranean and Black seas. Türkiye’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes the agreement as the foundation of the current passage regime through the Turkish Straits.
Its longevity is significant. Montreux has survived the Second World War, the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO’s expansion into the Black Sea region and, most recently, Russia’s war against Ukraine.
But it is not simply a diplomatic relic. It remains an active instrument of maritime strategy.
A treaty built around geography
The Bosporus and Dardanelles form the only maritime connection between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Any warship seeking to enter or leave the Black Sea by sea must pass through waters controlled by Türkiye.
Montreux converted that geographic reality into a formal regulatory system. It gave Black Sea states broader naval access while placing restrictions on the number, aggregate tonnage and duration of deployment of warships belonging to non-Black Sea powers.
Under Türkiye’s implementation of the Montreux Convention, governments must provide advance diplomatic notification before their warships pass through the Straits. The notification period is eight days for Black Sea states and 15 days for non-Black Sea states.
Non-littoral navies are also unable to maintain an unrestricted or permanent presence in the Black Sea. Their vessels are subject to tonnage limits and may generally remain in the sea for no longer than 21 days.
This creates a regional balance that neither Russia nor NATO can disregard.
Russia benefits during peacetime because the convention limits the scale and duration of naval deployments by outside powers. The United States, Britain and other NATO members cannot simply maintain large surface groups in the Black Sea indefinitely.
At the same time, Russia depends upon the Turkish Straits to reinforce, rotate or redeploy naval forces between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. That dependency became particularly important after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
Türkiye’s wartime gatekeeping
After recognising that a state of war existed between Russia and Ukraine, Ankara moved to apply the convention’s wartime provisions.
Under Article 19 of the Montreux Convention, warships belonging to belligerent states are generally prohibited from passing through the Straits when Türkiye is not itself a party to the conflict. An exception allows vessels separated from their registered bases to return home.
Türkiye subsequently asked both Black Sea and non-Black Sea states not to send warships through the Straits. Its decision restricted Russia’s ability to reinforce the Black Sea Fleet from other naval commands, while also preventing NATO members from substantially expanding their naval presence in the theatre.
This was not a symbolic act.
Russian warships operating outside the Black Sea could not automatically be transferred into the theatre to replace losses or increase pressure on Ukraine. Ankara reportedly informed Moscow that several vessels it wanted to send through the Straits were not registered at Black Sea bases and therefore did not qualify for the return-to-base exemption.
Türkiye’s enforcement has also applied to Ukraine and its Western supporters.
The decision demonstrated that Türkiye was not merely using the convention to obstruct Russia. It was maintaining a wider restriction on the introduction of additional belligerent naval assets into the Black Sea.
Montreux therefore functions as both a barrier and a stabiliser. It constrains Russian reinforcement, but it also limits NATO and Ukrainian options.
The power to limit escalation
The Black Sea war has increasingly been shaped by missiles, unmanned surface vessels, aerial drones and attacks against ports and commercial shipping rather than conventional fleet engagements.
Ukraine’s asymmetric maritime campaign has damaged or destroyed Russian naval assets and forced much of the surviving Black Sea Fleet to operate farther east, away from occupied Crimea. Russia, meanwhile, continues to use the maritime domain to launch missile attacks, protect logistical routes and exert pressure on Ukrainian trade.
Yet neither side has been able to treat the Black Sea as an unrestricted naval space.
Montreux has helped prevent the conflict from becoming a direct contest between the Russian Navy and large NATO naval formations. Türkiye’s control of the Straits has placed a legal and geographic ceiling on conventional naval escalation, even as missiles, drones and attacks on commercial shipping have complicated the wider security environment.
That does not mean the convention guarantees peace.
It cannot prevent attacks within the Black Sea, remove drifting mines, protect merchant vessels from drones or stop coastal states from expanding their fleets through domestic shipbuilding.
It does, however, regulate which outside naval forces can enter the theatre and under what conditions.
The restrictions have also encouraged Black Sea states to develop regional security mechanisms that do not require the entry of additional external warships. Türkiye, Romania and Bulgaria, for example, established a Black Sea mine-countermeasures task group to address the threat posed by drifting mines while remaining within the broader Montreux framework.
Strategic autonomy through the Straits
Türkiye’s renewed commitment to Montreux is also a statement about sovereignty.
Ankara has maintained political, economic and security relationships with both Moscow and Kyiv. It has supported Ukrainian territorial integrity and restricted Russian naval movement while continuing energy, commercial and diplomatic relations with Russia.
Control of the Straits gives Türkiye room to pursue that balancing strategy.
It does not need to align completely with either Russia or its NATO partners to remain indispensable to both. Geography, reinforced by the convention, ensures that Ankara must be consulted in any serious discussion concerning naval security, mine clearance, post-war guarantees or the future balance of power in the Black Sea.
Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has previously described the country’s priority under Montreux as preserving calm in the Black Sea and preventing actions that could further endanger the region.
This is why Montreux matters beyond maritime law.
It is a mechanism through which Türkiye converts control of a corridor into diplomatic leverage, military relevance and strategic autonomy.
What comes after the war?
The convention may become even more important if the fighting in Ukraine eventually produces a ceasefire or political settlement.
Questions will emerge over when wartime restrictions should be relaxed, whether Ukrainian vessels constructed or held abroad can enter the Black Sea, how Russia might rebuild or reposition its fleet and what role NATO navies could play in mine clearance or future maritime-security operations.
Each of those questions will pass, literally and politically, through Türkiye.
The Montreux Convention has endured because it does not eliminate rivalry. Instead, it places boundaries around how maritime power can be introduced into a strategically enclosed sea.
Ninety years after its signing, the agreement continues to show that corridors are not defined only by the ships and cargoes moving through them. They are also shaped by the rules governing access—and by the states with the authority to enforce those rules.
Dean Mikkelsen is Founder and Editorial Director of Power & Corridors. Based in Abu Dhabi, he focuses on geopolitical risk, maritime security, trade corridors, energy, logistics and critical infrastructure.
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