Tim Clark’s call for manufacturers to establish operations in Dubai reflects a broader UAE strategy to localise aircraft production, expand maintenance capacity and strengthen the aviation systems supporting trade, food security and economic growth.
The Gulf is not abandoning the Strait of Hormuz. It is building layers of redundancy around it.
Pipelines, alternative ports, rail connections, storage and air transport are increasingly being viewed as strategic infrastructure rather than supplementary capacity. Their purpose is not to replace Hormuz entirely, but to preserve movement when maritime access becomes uncertain, expensive or politically conditional.
That distinction is central to the latest episode of The Energy Show. Host Mike Mauceli speaks with Dean Mikkelsen, an Abu Dhabi-based geopolitical and energy analyst, about how Gulf states are reshaping energy and logistics networks as the Iran conflict, Houthi attacks and uncertainty in the Red Sea expose the limits of dependence on a small number of maritime corridors.
The conversation
The episode, The Twilight of Hormuz, examines the changing geography of Gulf energy and transport.
The discussion covers how life in Abu Dhabi has changed during the Iran conflict; how long Hormuz will remain a vital energy route; whether Kharg Island could become a US target; whether Iran anticipates Gulf states bypassing the Strait; Houthi attacks on Saudi shipping; the condition of Red Sea access; the growing use of rail and air transport; new pipeline construction; and the regional implications of a possible US–Saudi nuclear agreement.
Taken together, these questions point beyond the immediate crisis. They concern how states redesign supply chains when a chokepoint remains indispensable but can no longer be treated as reliably neutral.
Building layers of redundancy
Hormuz cannot be engineered out of the Gulf economy. Its scale, geography and connection to established production and export systems make complete replacement unrealistic.
The emerging response is therefore layered rather than absolute. Pipelines can move some energy exports to terminals outside the Strait. Rail can support overland movement of selected goods. Air transport can protect time-sensitive and high-value supply chains. Strategic storage can absorb short disruptions, while alternative ports preserve options when one maritime route becomes difficult to use.
Each layer is less efficient than unconstrained maritime movement. Yet efficiency is no longer the only measure. Infrastructure that appears underused in normal conditions can become highly valuable when it preserves optionality during crisis.
Bypassing one corridor exposes another
Alternative routes do not eliminate geopolitical exposure. They redistribute it.
Saudi Arabia can move crude westwards towards Yanbu, but Red Sea access remains vulnerable to Houthi pressure and conditions at the Bab al-Mandab. The UAE can direct some exports towards Fujairah outside Hormuz, but capacity, pipeline limits and the continuing role of Gulf terminals prevent it from becoming a complete substitute.
Rail and air transport can support resilience, but they cannot reproduce the scale or cost advantages of maritime trade. Their importance lies in keeping selected flows moving, protecting critical inputs and buying time while larger routes are disrupted.
The Gulf is therefore not escaping chokepoints. It is creating a network in which disruption at one corridor can be absorbed, partially rerouted or delayed through another.
Power & Corridors assessment
The lasting consequence of the Hormuz crisis will not be the abandonment of the Strait. It will be a higher strategic value placed on infrastructure that preserves movement when access becomes uncertain.
Pipelines, alternative terminals, storage, rail and air transport are becoming instruments of geopolitical resilience. Their value lies not only in throughput, but in the choices they preserve during conflict.
This also changes how projects should be judged. Spare capacity is no longer simply an accounting inefficiency. In a contested corridor system, it can function as strategic insurance.
The central risk is displacement rather than resolution: bypassing Hormuz may increase dependence on the Red Sea, overland routes or another port system exposed to different forms of coercion.
Operational indicators
What to watch
Pipeline expansion New capacity designed to move crude, products or gas towards terminals outside Hormuz.
Fujairah and Yanbu Investment in storage, loading capacity and supporting infrastructure at the Gulf’s principal bypass terminals.
Rail freight Greater use of Gulf rail networks for high-value, time-sensitive or strategically important cargo.
Air transport Continued chartering or dedicated airlift for food, industrial inputs and critical supplies.
Red Sea exposure Whether Houthi pressure reduces the value of Saudi Arabia’s westward energy and logistics alternatives.
Commercial pricing How insurers, charterers and cargo owners value redundancy, alternative routing and spare capacity.
The connection
The earlier Power & Corridors Briefing examined how Iran and the Houthis are testing whether coercive control over maritime corridors can be converted into authority, revenue and selective access.
This podcast conversation addresses the other side of that equation: how states and companies respond when open passage can no longer be assumed.
One side is attempting to set new terms for movement. The other is building enough redundancy to avoid having all movement governed by those terms.
Listen to the podcast
The Twilight of Hormuz
The Energy Show with host Mike Mauceli and guest Dean Mikkelsen. The 20-minute conversation examines pipelines, rail, air transport, the Red Sea, Houthi pressure on Saudi shipping, Kharg Island and the changing geography of Gulf energy.
Dean Mikkelsen is Founder and Editorial Director of Power & Corridors. Based in Abu Dhabi, he focuses on geopolitical risk, maritime security, trade corridors, energy, logistics and critical infrastructure.
