Bab-el-Mandeb remains navigable, but selective tanker disruption, rising insurance pressure and shifting Saudi energy flows are creating a more complicated commercial risk picture.
The Bab-el-Mandeb is not closed. But it is no longer operating normally either.
Vessel traffic fell sharply following the July Houthi blockade targeting Saudi Arabia
and has since stabilised below previous levels. Tankers have absorbed more of the
disruption than container shipping. The emerging risk is not necessarily a physical
closure of the strait, but a gradual shift towards sustained commercial avoidance.
Main briefing · Maritime corridors
Bab-el-Mandeb is open — but it is no longer normal
Selective disruption is already changing tanker behaviour.
The next question is whether pressure becomes sustained commercial avoidance.
The maritime picture following July's escalation is becoming clearer.
Traffic through Bab-el-Mandeb initially fell by roughly a quarter following the
Houthi blockade targeting Saudi Arabia. It then stabilised rather than continuing
to collapse. By mid-August, overall traffic remained below the pre-blockade period,
while mainstream crude tanker movements were materially weaker.
Container shipping has proved more resilient.
This creates an important distinction between physical access
and commercial access.
A strait can remain open while becoming increasingly expensive or unattractive
to use. Shipowners must consider vessel exposure. Charterers must consider delays
and contractual risk. Insurers must price the possibility of attack. Cargo owners
must determine how much uncertainty they are prepared to absorb.
The corridor has not been abandoned. It is being priced.
NERAI corridor model
The risk curve is rising
NERAI places the probability of a material disruption event at:
2 weeks15.8%
4 weeks47.0%
8 weeks74.6%
These are disruption probabilities, not probabilities that the strait
will physically or formally close.
Energy corridors
The Saudi dimension
The pressure is particularly important because Saudi Arabia has become more
dependent on its western export route.
Oil flows through Bab-el-Mandeb rose sharply during 2026 as Saudi crude was
redirected away from the disrupted Strait of Hormuz towards Yanbu and the Red Sea.
That increased the strategic importance of the western route at the same time that
Saudi infrastructure again became exposed to Houthi attack.
July attacks against energy infrastructure at Jizan and Yanbu demonstrated that
Saudi oil and logistics assets are already within the operational target environment.
The risk therefore extends beyond vessels passing Yemen. It reaches across the
infrastructure system connecting production, pipelines, storage, terminals, ports
and maritime export routes.
Commercial closure would probably happen gradually
A serious tanker strike, a cluster of attacks against commercial vessels,
a widening of Houthi targeting beyond Saudi-linked shipping, or another material
change in war-risk insurance conditions could cause operators to reassess the
corridor rapidly.
The result would probably not be every vessel turning around simultaneously.
It would begin selectively. Higher-risk vessels would divert. Mainstream tanker
operators could reduce exposure. Insurance conditions would tighten. Charterers
would increasingly favour Cape routing. Cargo owners would begin building additional
transit time into supply chains.
Only later would the change become visible as a large decline in aggregate traffic.
Scenario outlook
The next eight weeks
55%
Contained pressure with managed escalation
Selective disruption persists and war-risk premiums remain elevated,
but there is no corridor-wide commercial withdrawal.
30%
Expanding confrontation and partial commercial closure
Major carriers increasingly avoid the corridor and Cape of Good Hope
rerouting becomes substantially more widespread.
10%
Systemic escalation and sustained effective closure
Wider regional conflict combines with vessel attacks, retaliation
and commercial avoidance to make the corridor operationally unacceptable.
The remaining 5% is reserved for mixed or indeterminate outcomes.
Monitoring indicators
What to watch
Commercial carrier behaviour
Whether tanker avoidance spreads to major container operators.
Coordinated suspensions would indicate that selective disruption
is becoming generalised.
Vessel attacks
A cluster of commercial-vessel strikes, or one high-consequence hit
on a tanker, container ship or LNG carrier.
Houthi targeting criteria
Expansion from Saudi-linked shipping to broader commercial targets
would materially alter the risk profile.
War-risk insurance
Another Joint War Committee amendment, materially higher premiums
or tighter underwriting conditions.
Saudi military posture
Renewed sustained Saudi strikes against Houthi positions would mark
a significant change in the current conflict structure.
Suez and Egypt
Egypt remains an important spillover indicator because Red Sea disruption
transmits through traffic, revenue, insurance and regional security.
Commercial risk
Why insurance may become the real chokepoint
Physical geography usually defines a maritime chokepoint.
Commercial geography can define one too.
Bab-el-Mandeb can remain navigable while insurance premiums,
contractual restrictions, vessel availability and corporate risk limits
progressively narrow the number of operators willing to transit it.
The decisive signal may therefore not come from a military announcement.
It may come from an underwriter, a chartering desk, or several major carriers
deciding that another ten days around Africa is preferable to accepting
the risk of sailing through the Red Sea.
NERAI Foresight Desk
Read the full briefing
The full analyst assessment includes the underlying NERAI modelling,
scenario methodology, early-warning indicators, cross-corridor comparisons
and external verification notes.
Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb are becoming one corridor problem
Bab-el-Mandeb can no longer be viewed separately from the Strait of Hormuz.
Disruption in Hormuz has increased the importance of Saudi Arabia's western export
system. That has pushed more strategic weight onto Yanbu, the Red Sea and
Bab-el-Mandeb precisely as the security environment around Yemen has deteriorated.
The result is a corridor problem rather than a single-chokepoint problem.
Energy can be rerouted. Ships can be diverted. Pipelines can bypass individual
waterways. But every alternative creates a new concentration of infrastructure,
traffic and strategic exposure somewhere else.
Bottom line:
resilience does not eliminate risk. It moves it.
Dean Mikkelsen is Founder and Editorial Director of Power & Corridors. Based in Abu Dhabi, he focuses on geopolitical risk, maritime security, trade corridors, energy, logistics and critical infrastructure.
