Türkiye’s Blue Homeland doctrine is often described as a maritime claims map or as a slogan of Turkish naval assertiveness. But a recent academic study by Ferhan Oral and Serhat Süha Çubukçuoğlu offers a more useful way to understand it: as part of Türkiye’s attempt to move from a historically land-oriented power toward a maritime state with regional sea-power ambitions.
The paper, Assessing Türkiye’s Blue Homeland Doctrine through Mahanian Sea Power Theory, examines Blue Homeland through the ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the American naval strategist who argued that sea power depends not only on warships, but also on trade, ports, bases, geography, national character and government policy. That framing matters because it moves the discussion away from maps and slogans and toward the harder question: can Türkiye convert doctrine into durable maritime influence?
The authors argue that Blue Homeland has helped reshape Türkiye’s naval strategy by supporting naval modernisation, expanding maritime awareness, reinforcing offshore energy ambitions and encouraging a more forward posture in the Eastern Mediterranean, Black Sea, Red Sea and Western Indian Ocean. Türkiye’s growing domestic defence industry is central to that story. Indigenous naval platforms, anti-ship missiles, combat systems, unmanned vessels, submarines and future carrier ambitions all point to a state trying to reduce dependency on external suppliers and build its own maritime-industrial base.
This is where Blue Homeland becomes more than a doctrine. It is also a strategic brand. It links sovereignty, energy, shipbuilding, ports, overseas basing, maritime trade and national identity into one political language. For Türkiye, the sea is no longer just a defensive boundary. It is becoming a theatre of economic competition, power projection and regional influence.
Yet the study is careful not to overstate the case. Türkiye is not yet a full sea power in the Mahanian sense. It is better understood as a developing regional naval power with sea-power ambitions. The authors point to several constraints: the absence of a fully codified maritime strategy, institutional fragmentation, economic pressures and the persistence of a land-centric strategic culture. Since 2020, Türkiye has also moderated some of its more assertive Eastern Mediterranean activity, suggesting that Blue Homeland remains powerful as a domestic and strategic narrative, even when its operational use is calibrated.
For trade, energy and maritime-security watchers, the importance of Blue Homeland lies in what it reveals about Türkiye’s wider direction. The doctrine connects the Aegean, Cyprus, Libya, Somalia, Qatar, the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean into a broader maritime arc. It also shows how Ankara views offshore energy, naval presence and sea lines of communication as part of the same strategic picture.
The real test will not be whether Türkiye continues to use the phrase “Blue Homeland.” It almost certainly will. The real test will be whether Türkiye can sustain the fleet, bases, commercial maritime infrastructure, shipbuilding capacity, maritime education and political coordination needed to turn doctrine into lasting sea power.
That makes Blue Homeland less a finished strategy than a maritime transition. Türkiye has built the language of sea power. It is now trying to build the material architecture behind it.
Dean Mikkelsen is Founder and Editorial Director of Power & Corridors. Based in Abu Dhabi, he focuses on geopolitical risk, maritime security, trade corridors, energy, logistics and critical infrastructure.
