Three Corridors, Three Risk Channels — July 2026
Corridor risk can build through compliance, insurance and strategy before freight prices react.
Jones Act waivers expose America’s deeper maritime capacity and shipbuilding weakness.
The Jones Act is usually framed as an old American shipping law. That is too narrow.
The current debate is really about whether the United States still has the maritime capacity, shipbuilding base, crews and domestic logistics flexibility that a major maritime power assumes it has. The law itself is straightforward in principle: cargo moving between U.S. points must generally be carried on vessels that are U.S.-built, U.S.-owned and coastwise-qualified under U.S. rules. The U.S. Maritime Administration describes domestic coastwise shipping as trade requiring vessels that are built in the United States, owned by U.S. citizens and endorsed for coastwise trade by the U.S. Coast Guard.¹
That framework was designed to protect domestic shipping and shipbuilding. It was also meant to ensure that the United States retained a merchant marine and maritime industrial base that could support national defence and commercial continuity in wartime or emergency. Congressional Research Service analysis has long described the Jones Act as a recurring issue in Congress because it sits between two claims: national security and economic cost.²
The problem is that every major disruption now exposes the same contradiction. The Jones Act is defended as a national security instrument, yet Washington often reaches for waivers precisely when a national security or economic shock places pressure on the system.